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ROYE REALTY & DEVELOPING, INC. v. WATSON:
OKLAHOMA DECIDES THE ROYALTY
OBLIGATION ON TAKE-OR-PAY SETTLEMENTS
USING 'PLAIN TERMS" ANALYSIS
Gene G. Boemer J1It
I. INTRODUCTION
There are few cases in the field of oil and gas law that have generated as
much attention and anticipation as Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson.'
Take-or-pay settlements amounted to billions of dollars nationwide,2 and there
is currently a meager amount of case law on the resulting royalty obligation.
Oklahoma's decision would affect considerable interests in the oil and gas in-
dustry. The question of whether royalty is due on take-or-pay settlements was
to be answered by Oklahoma's highest court. The answer was both surprising
and unsettling. Using strict notions of contract interpretation, the court ruled
that royalty is not due on take-or-pay settlements. At the heart of the court's
lease interpretation was its statement that "production" meant actual and physi-
cal extraction of the mineral. In defining "production," the court departed from
its own precedent and confused the state of fundamental principles of Oklahoma
oil and gas law.
This paper will discuss the two leading theories of lease interpretation
relied upon by courts in deciding whether royalty is due on take-or-pay pay-
ments and settlements. Against this theoretical backdrop, the decision in Roye
Realty will be analyzed to determine the nature of the reasoning adopted by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in resolving the issue of whether royalty is due on
take-or-pay settlements. Furthermore, the Roye Realty court's failure to apply
traditional notions of Oklahoma's oil and gas law will be discussed, and the
t Associate, Pezold, Richey, Caruso & Barker, Tulsa, Oklahoma. J.D., 1997, University of Oklahoma;
B.A., 1994, University of Tulsa. The author gratefully acknowledges the support and commentary of friends,
colleagues, and professors with regard to the development of this paper.
1. 949 P.2d 1208 (Okla. 1996).
2. See John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation, 49 SMU L. REV. 223, 227 (1996) (estimated
take-or-pay settlement costs are in the range of twelve to fifteen billion dollars).
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difference in the outcome of Roye Realty from decisions in similar jurisdictions
will be examined. To the extent possible, this paper will attempt to harmonize
the Roye Realty decision with Oklahoma precedent and the theories relied upon
by similar jurisdictions in deciding the same issue.
This paper will also set forth an argument that royalty owners can prevail
under the plain-terms analysis adopted in the Roye Realty decision, given favor-
able definitions of the key lease terms. Additionally, this paper will discuss the
implications of the plain-terms analysis on other portions of producer-purchaser
settlements that do not represent take-or-pay settlements.
II. THEORIES APPLIED IN DECIDING WHETHER ROYALTY Is DUE ON TAKE-OR-
PAY SETrLEMENTS
There are essentially two lines of reasoning that have developed in deter-
mining whether royalty is due on take-or-pay benefits. Courts finding in favor
of the producer/lessee generally apply strict interpretations of contract terms,
and as a result have been referred to as "plain-terms" jurisdictions.3 Plain-terms
jurisdictions find the standard royalty clause to be unambiguous and determine
the royalty obligation based on the legal meaning of the terms in the lease.
Since most leases limit the royalty obligation to gas "produced," plain-terms
courts find that no royalty is owed on take-or-pay payments that are made in
lieu of production.
Although plain-terms decisions have favored producers, a royalty owner
may prevail in plain-terms jurisdictions that have a broad definition of "produc-
tion." For instance, in jurisdictions where "production" under the lease is de-
fined as "capability of production," take-or-pay payments may be construed as
royalty-bearing under the plain terms of the lease. The rationale is that take-or-
pay payments are made for gas that the producer is capable of producing, but
that the purchaser does not take. Therefore, the "capability of production" is
marketed under the gas purchase contract via the take-or-pay clause, and royalty
is owed under the plain terms of the lease. However, no plain-terms jurisdiction
has adopted this argument.
Other jurisdictions might be described as "cooperative venture" jurisdic-
tions, because their decisions are based on notions of the lessor-lessee relation-
ship represented in an oil and gas lease.4 Cooperative venture jurisdictions have
found the royalty clause to be ambiguous with regard to take-or-pay payments
and look to the purpose behind the lease to resolve the issue. These courts have
generally ruled in favor of royalty owners. Currently, the majority of courts
faced with the issue of royalty on a take-or-pay basis have adopted the plain-
terms analysis.5 However, there is reason to believe that the cooperative yen-
3. See id. at 235.
4. See id.
5. See Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988); Harvey E. Yates
Co. v. Powell, 98 F.3d 1222, 1230 (10th Cir. 1996) (recognizing the plain-terms analysis as the majority
[Vol. 33:891
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ture theory will become more widely accepted as better recognizing the reality
of what is an inherently complex issue.6
A. "Plain-terms" Jurisdictions: Arguments Favoring Producers
Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel7 is probably the most widely
cited plain-terms case.8 In Diamond Shamrock, the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals was faced with the issue of whether royalty was due on take-or-pay pay-
ments under the provisions of a federal offshore lease.9 The lease clause called
for royalty of "16 2/3 percent in amount or value of production saved, removed,
or sold from the leased area."' The court determined that the plain meaning of
the terms in the royalty clause was dispositive." Under the court's interpreta-
tion, "production" does not occur until there is actual severance of the minerals
from the formation. 2 There must be production in order for there to be some-
thing to value for purposes of the royalty clause. 3 Therefore, royalty payments
are not due on take-or-pay payments unless and until gas is actually severed
and taken.'4 Furthermore, the court determined the nature of take-or-pay pay-
ments as being "intended to compensate primarily the producer, not the owner
of the minerals, for the risks associated with development production."'5
Diamond Shamrock represents the prototypical plain-terms argument. The
court's definition of "production" leads to the quick resolution that take-or-pay
payments are not subject to royalty. Plain-terms jurisdictions define "produc-
tion" as actual severance of the minerals. Since take-or-pay payments are for
gas not produced or taken, the royalty clause is not triggered. Moreover, plain-
terms jurisdictions generally agree with the idea that take-or-pay payments serve
primarily to compensate the producer for risks and ensure a predictable stream
of income. Therefore, a lessor should not be allowed to share in such payments.
Other plain-terms cases have expanded the typical argument to address the
competing cooperative venture theory.
view); Killam Oil Co. v. Brni, 806 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. CL App. 1991); State v. Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975
(Wyo. 1988).
6. See Lowe, supra note 2, at 252-53 (citing three factors in support of this conclusion: the theory that
the lease is a cooperative venture makes sense in lease transactions, examining the plain terms makes little
sense in the context in which leases are made and used, and the history of royalty disputes supports the coop-
erative venture theory).
7. 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988).
8. See Lowe, supra note 2, at 237.
9. See Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1161, 1163.
10. Id. at 1163.
11. See id. at 1165.
12. See id. at 1168.
13. See id. at 1167.
14. See id. at 1168.
15. Id. at 1167. But see Randy King, Royalty Owner Claims to Take-or-Pay Payments under the Implied
Covenant to Market and the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 33 S. Tax. L. REv. 801, 821 (1992)
("[wihy should the purpose for which the lessee and the pipeline enter into a gas contract dictate the terms of
the relationship between the lessor and the lessee? Generally, the oil and gas lease establishes the lessor-lessee
relationship before the gas contract comes into existence. The subsequent creation of the gas contract between
the lessee and the pipeline should not then change the lessor-lessee relationship.").
1998]
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In Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell,6 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed claims by a state lessor for royalty on take-or-pay payments made in
settlement of gas purchasers' obligations. 7 The relevant royalty clause provid-
ed that "lessee shall pay lessor as royalty one-eighth of the cash value of the
gas, including casing-head gas, produced and saved from the leased premises
and marketed or utilized."'" The court recognized that a "lease must be given
the legal effect resulting from a construction of the language contained within
the four comers of the instrument" unless its provisions are ambiguous. 9 Am-
biguity exists only where the contract language may be "fairly and reasonably
construed in different ways. ' '"o
The court found the royalty clause to be clear and unambiguous under its
plain terms.2 The lessee was not obligated to pay a royalty on the cash value
of gas except to the extent that such gas was produced and saved from the
leased property.' Production under the royalty clause required physical extrac-
tion of the gas from the land.23 Royalty is not due on take-or-pay payments
except on amounts recouped by the purchaser in the form of actual production,
and not until such point of recoupment does the royalty obligation arise.2" The
court distinguished jurisdictions adopting the cooperative venture approach in
that such jurisdictions had unique state statutes in place which gave an expand-
ed meaning to the term "royalty."'as The court predicted that New Mexico
would not adopt a cooperative venture analysis because no similar royalty-de-
fining statute existed in New Mexico.26
The court in Harvey E. Yates makes an interesting point in that the cooper-
ative venture jurisdictions both have statutes in place defining "royalty" in a
rather broad way. It is unclear, however, how much impact these statutes had in
influencing the choice of a cooperative venture analysis.27 To the extent a
16. 98 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1996).
17. See id. at 1229.
18. Id. The language of this clause was taken from the New Mexico statutory lease found at N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 19-10-4.1 (Michie 1994).
19. Id. at 1230 (quoting Owens v. Superior Oil Co., 730 P.2d 458, 459 (N.M. 1986)).
20. Id. (quoting Harper Oil Co. v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 733 P.2d 1313, 1316 (N.M. 1987)).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. See also Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159, 1165 ("[R]oyalties
are not owed unless and until actual production."); Killam Oil Co. v. Bnxni, 806 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex. App.
1991) ("IT]he lease entitled the [lessor] to royalty payments on gas actually produced."); Mandell v. Hamman
Oil & Ref. Co., 822 S.W.2d 153, 165 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) ("Production is the key to royalty."); State v.
Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975, 981 (Wyo. 1988) ("By its clear terms, [the lease] manifests the intention of the
parties that royalty payments were to be made only in the event of production from the lease, that is, after
physical extraction of the gas from the land and its sale or use.").
24. See Harvey E. Yates, 98 F.3d at 1236.
25. See id. at 1233. See also Lowe, supra note 2, at 257 ("[B]oth Frey and Klein were based in part
upon unusual state statutes that may expand the royalty obligation on an unjust enrichment theory.... Most
states, including Oklahoma, apparently have no such legislation. Thus, to the extent that Frey and Klein were
based upon statutory language, they may stand alone." (emphasis added)).
26. See Harvey E. Yates Co., 98 F.3d at 1234.
27. See Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 172 (La. 1992) ("[The rather expansive definition of
royalty in [LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §31-213(5) (West 1992)] is not dispositive of the lessor's right to a royalty
share of take-or-pay payments."); Klein v. Jones, 980 F.2d 521, 529 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 15-74-705 (Michie 1987) as imposing duty on lessee to protect lessor's royalty interest); See also Lowe,
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court desires a pro-producer outcome, the presence of these statutes makes a
convenient distinction. However, there is no indication from the cooperative
venture decisions that the presence of such statutes was anything more than just
another factor in the courts' analyses.2
In Killam Oil Co. v. Bruni,29 trustee-lessors brought suit against lessees
seeking royalty payments on take-or-pay settlement proceeds. The lease royalty
clause provided for royalties to be paid on one-eighth of the amount realized
"on gas, including casinghead gas and all gaseous substances, produced from
said land and sold or used off the premises."' The lease alone is deemed to
express the parties' intent unless a conflict or ambiguity exists. 3' The court
recognized that "it has become well established under Texas law that the term
'production' as used in oil and gas leases means actual physical extraction of
the mineral from the soil."'32 The court found that the parties knew how to pro-
vide for royalties, and the Trust "unambiguously limited its right to royalty pay-
ments only from gas actually extracted from the land. 33 Furthermore, "take-
or-pay payments do not constitute any part of the price paid for produced gas,
nor do they have the effect of increasing the price paid for gas that was tak-
en."
34
The Killam court went further than most plain-terms opinions by implying
that the parties-particularly the lessor-knew that take-or-pay payments would
be received when the parties agreed to the language of the royalty provision.'
To the extent either of the parties could have anticipated the chain of events
leading to the massive take-or-pay obligations suffered by pipeline purchasers,
such an argument is tenuous. This argument also fails to take into account that
the drafting party and the more sophisticated party is usually the producer-les-
see. The producer may well anticipate what kind of sales arrangements it will
enter into, and whether the contract will have a take-or-pay provision. The
lessor, who normally has no right under the lease to market gas and no capabil-
ity to market gas even if he had the right, usually has no knowledge of the gas
sales arrangements.
The plain-terms analysis has also been applied to cases where the royalty
owner is claiming that royalty on take-or-pay payments is required under the
implied covenant to market.' In Mandell v. Hamman Oil & Refining Co.,'
supra note 2, at 257.
28. See Lowe, supra note 2, at 257.
29. 806 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
30. Id. at 266.
31. See id. (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Tex. 1981)).
32. Id. at 267. (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid, 337 S.W.2d 267 (rex. 1960) and Rogers v. Osbom, 261
S.W.2d 311 (rex. 1953)).
33. Id. at 268.
34. Id. But see Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 180 (La. 1992) ("[Tlake-or-pay payments ef-
fectively increase the price of gas actually delivered to the pipeline. Failure to characterize these payments as
part of the total price paid for gas sold under the contract is to disregard the obvious economic considerations
underlying the take-or-pay clause.").
35. See Killam Oil Co., 806 S.V.2d at 268.
36. See Mandell v. Hamman Oil & Ref. Co., 822 S.W.2d 153, 164-65 (rex. Ct. App. 1991). See also
Patrick H. Martin, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases: Past, Present & Future, 33 WASHBURN L.J.
1998]
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the court held that a lessee's implied duty to market under an oil and gas lease
is limited to marketing production, and therefore is not applicable to take-or-pay
payments made in lieu of production." While such a decision may pass muster
in states defining "production" as actual extraction of the minerals, the same
reasoning should support a royalty obligation on take-or-pay payments in states
where "production" is satisfied by the capability of production. Furthermore, in
a recent decision, a plain-terms jurisdiction has interpreted the implied covenant
to market to require payment of royalties on settlement agreements that compro-
mise the price of gas received under the gas purchase contract."
B. "Cooperative Venture" Jurisdictions: Arguments Favoring Royalty Owners
The cooperative venture analysis, which has its roots in principles suggest-
ed by Professor Thomas Harrell, is useful in weighing arguments presented in
market value royalty cases.' Professor Harrell states:
[W]here the lessor's return from the contract is to be a fractional royalty
based upon production, then, in a very loose and nontechnical sense, the
arrangement is in the nature of a cooperative venture with the lessor con-
tributing the land and the lessee contributing the capital and expertise nec-
essary to develop the minerals for the mutual benefit of both parties. From
this arises the affirmative, although implied, obligation of the lessee to
market or dispose of the product in a reasonable and prudent way to se-
cure the maximum benefit possible for both parties.4
Harrel identifies the purpose behind the royalty clause as fixing the divi-
sion of economic benefits that the lessee and lessor hope to realize from the
property.' Furthermore, any determination of the market value of gas which
permits the lessor or lessee to receive a greater amount of the gross revenues
from the property than the fractional division provided for in the lease is inher-
ently contrary to the basic nature of the lease.' These principles are useful in
determining whether royalty should be paid on take-or-pay payments and are
heavily relied on in the following cases.
In Frey v. Amoco Production Co.,44 the Supreme Court of Louisiana an-
swered a federally certified question of whether a lessor is entitled to royalties
on take-or-pay payments made to a lessee by a natural gas pipeline purchas-
639, 653-58 (1994) (discussing implied covenant to market as it relates to current take-or-pay litigation).
37. 822 S.W.2d 153 CTex. Ct. App. 1991).
38. See id. at 164-165. See also King, supra note 15, at 813.
39. See Watts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 115 F.3d 785, 794 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Under Oklahoma law, a
producer... has the 'duty to market the gas produced from a well and to obtain the best price and terms
available.' Barby v. Cabot Corp., 550 F. Supp. 188, 190 (W.D. Okla. 1981) .... To prevail on their claim at
trial, Lessors initially must show that a higher price was available at the time of the settlement agreement.").
40. See Thomas A. Harrell, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil & Gas Law, 30 INsT. ON OIL & GAS L.
& TAX'N 311, 334-37 (1979).
41. Id. at 334.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 336.
44. 603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992).
[Vol. 33:891
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er.' The lease's royalty clause provided a "royalty on gas sold by the Lessee
[of] one-fifth (1/5) of the amount realized at the well from such sales." The
royalty clause did not refer to "production" or require that gas be "produced."
While recognizing that the lease contract is the law between the parties, the
court remained cognizant that the terms of such leases are not able to, nor were
they intended to, accommodate every eventuality.' Finding it unlikely that the
parties contemplated that producers would receive take-or-pay payments in
settlement of gas contract litigation, the court determined that the royalty clause
was ambiguous with regard to this issue.s Looking to the general intent of the
parties to develop the land for the mutual benefit of both parties, the court
reasoned that the royalty clause should be given an expansive reading.49
The court stated that "the royalty clause is construed not in the abstract but
in reference to the economic and practical considerations underlying the royalty
interest and with due regard to the relationship between the lessor and les-
see."50 Finding a lease to be an inherently bargained-for-exchange, the court
recognized that "a lessor would not relinquish a valuable right arising from the
leased premises without receiving something in return."' Recognizing the
principles espoused by Professor Harrell, the court concluded that "an oil and
gas lease, and the royalty clause therein, is rendered meaningless where the
lessee receives a higher percentage of the gross revenues generated by the
leased property than contemplated by the lease." 2
Addressing the argument that take-or-pay payments primarily compensate
the producer for risks, the court said, "[I]t is a myopic eye which perceives the
lessor as sharing none of the risks associated with bringing the gas to the
ground." '3 Risk of drainage to the lessor's property was prevented inasmuch as
the take-or-pay clause assures a relatively constant production of gas.54 Fur-
thermore, "both the lessee and the lessor share the risk of an erroneous market
forecast by the lessee, the lessor's royalty being dependent on the producer-
pipeline contract."'
The Frey court differentiated the events necessary to trigger royalties on
oil or gas. "[Rloyalty on oil and miscellaneous minerals is triggered by produc-
tion."' Royalty on gas is generally not triggered by production because of the
45. See id. at 170.
46. Id. at 169.
47. See id. at 172.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 173.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 174. (citing Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334, 1339 (La. 1982)).
53. Id. at 178. (citing William H. white, The Right to Recover Royalties on Natural Gas Take-or-Pay
Settlements, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 663, 669 (1988)).
54. See id.
55. Id. at 179. However, it should be noted that the royalty interest owner gets one-eighth (approximate-
ly) risk-free, while the working interest owner gets seven-eighth to compensate the working interest owner for
taking all of the economic risk. Therefore, it may be argued that the parties have already dealt with the alloca-
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inability for lessor to store or transport the production.57 However, the court
stated that the parties could have conditioned payment of royalties on produc-
tion of gas.58 The implication is that a "production" gas royalty clause would
have been dispositive of the matter in the lessee's favor.59
The court concluded its analysis with a discussion of the economics behind
take-or-pay clauses. "Because the producer is willing to negotiate a lower price
in exchange for the guarantee the pipeline will either take or pay for a specific
minimum quantity of natural gas, the take-or-pay provision effectively lowers
the price the producer charges the pipeline per unit of gas." It follows that
the price of gas and the royalty owed would be higher absent the take-or-pay
provision.6' The court applied this theory to conclude that the price of gas tak-
en under the purchase contract included "not only the contract price paid per
unit of gas delivered, but also the sums paid in the form of take-or-pay pay-
ments."6 2 "Failure to characterize these payments as part of the total price paid
for gas sold under the contract is to disregard the obvious economic consid-
erations underlying the take-or-pay clause." 3 There is a strong policy to allow
lessors to share in take-or-pay payments to reduce the incentive of lessees to
"compromise volume gas prices under their contracts or settlements in exchange
for favorable take-or-pay terms."'
Although the Frey economic analysis does not seem to be based upon
expert testimony or studies, the Frey opinion is the most comprehensively rea-
soned of the decisions concerning royalty on take-or-pay payments. The Frey
court's analysis of the purpose, economics, and risks inherent in both the royal-
ty clause and the take-or-pay provision provides a springboard for future deci-
sions addressing royalty issues. Indeed, the Frey reasoning was followed to a
large extent in Klein v. Jones.65
In Klein, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the issue of whether
royalty' is due on take-or-pay settlements, applying Arkansas law. The royalty
clause at issue stated, "Lessee shall pay Lessor as royalty on gas.., produced
from said land and sold or used by Lessee ... the market value at the mouth of
the wells of one-eighth (1/8) of such products so sold or used."'67 The court
rejected the lessors' argument that they were third-party beneficiaries of the gas
purchase contract, instead finding that the lessors were merely incidental benefi-
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Recall that the royalty clause in the Frey lease called for royalty on "amount realized." See supra
text accompanying note 46.





64. Id. at 182.
65. 980 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1992).
66. See id. at 531-32.
67. Id. at 525.
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ciaries.6 The court proceeded to decide the case based on the theory of unjust
enrichment.'
Reciting and agreeing with the reasoning in Frey, the court noted that "a
restrictive interpretation of the royalties clause in a conventional lease can be
inconsistent with its basic purpose and can produce results that are unintended
by the parties, and unfair to the lessor." ° Recognizing the "Harrell rule,"7'
the court found that take-or-pay payments should be distributed to royalty own-
ers as a fair distribution of the mutual benefits that arise from the lease transac-
tion.' In doing so, the court expanded the cooperative venture analysis to ap-
ply to gas royalty clauses with production triggers. The unjust enrichment ratio-
nale allowed the court to consider extra-lease factors in interpreting the royalty
clause, freeing the court to look past the term "production" in the royalty
clause!'
The effect the preceding analyses would have on Oklahoma courts was
uncertain before Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson.74 In the absence of
an objectively superior method, judges are vested with a great deal of influence
in determining the outcome. As one scholar noted, "[i]f no uniquely correct
resolution exists to a particular legal dispute, judges must decide as their per-
sonal convictions or political preferences dictate rather than as authoritative
legal materials prescribe." 5 Indeed, Professor John Lowe assessed that "jurists
have ample 'wiggle-room"' between the two approaches. 76 "The case and stat-
utory law in Oklahoma, for example, is different enough from that of Louisiana
and Arkansas to justify the Oklahoma Supreme Court's refusal to order royalty
on take-or-pay benefits." Lowe's assessment proved correct.
III. THE ROYE REALTY DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. ("Roye"), as lessee, and Watson, as les-
sor, entered into several oil and gas leases.78 Roye drilled and completed gas
wells capable of production in paying quantities on the leasehold property.79
Roye then entered into a gas purchase contract with Arkansas Louisiana Gas
68. Id. at 527.
69. Id. ("[A] person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another's ex-
pense .... ").
70. Klein, 980 F.2d at 531.
71. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
72. See Klein, 980 F.2d at 531-32.
73. See Bruce M. Kramer, Liability to Royalty Owners For Proceeds From Take-or-Pay and Settlement
Payments, 15 E. MiN. L. FOUND. §14.04 (1995).
74. 949 P.2d 1208 (Okla. 1996).
75. Eric Rakowski, Posner's Pragmatism, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1681, 1682 (1991) (book review).
76. Lowe, supra note 2, at 267.
77. Id.
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Company ("Arkla") that contained a take-or-pay provision.' Roye and Arkla
settled litigation over the take-or-pay clause in a confidential settlement agree-
ment." Subsequently, a dispute arose between Roye and Watson over whether
royalties were due on the settlement amount.8 Roye brought a declaratory
action in state court asking the court to define the parties' rights and liabilities
under the oil and gas leases. 3 Watson answered and sued Arkla as a third-
party defendant." Roye and Arkla filed motions for summary judgment, argu-
ing that Watson was not entitled to share in the settlement proceeds.' Watson
moved for summary judgment based on the argument that royalty was due on
the settlement proceeds. The trial court granted Roye and Arkla's motions
and denied Watson's motionY The court of appeals reversed and granted par-
tial summary judgment for Watson because royalty was due on the take-or-pay
settlement."s The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari. 89
B. Analysis
The supreme court began by affining Arkla's dismissal from the case.9'
Under Oklahoma statutory law, Arkla owed no obligation to Watson to pay
proceeds resulting from the gas purchase agreement with Roye.9" The court
then discussed, at length, how other jurisdictions have ruled on the issue of
whether royalty is due on take-or-pay benefits.' After a brief discussion of the
standard of review on appeal,93 the court addressed the primary issue of wheth-
er royalty is owed on take-or-pay settlements.
80. See id. The contract provided, in part:
If Buyer does not receive the annual minimum which Buyer is obligated to receive hereunder during
a particular Contract Year, and the annual minimum was available and tendered by Seller for delivery
hereunder in accordance with the provisions of this contract, Buyer shall pay to Seller at the price per
MMBtu payable hereunder on the last day of the particular Contract Year for a volume (hereinafter
for convenience referred to as the "annual shortage") equal to the difference between the volume
actually received during the Contract Year and the minimum volume Buyer was obligated to receive
during the year. If Buyer thus pays for an annual shortage not actually received, Buyer shall have the
right to recoup the volume thus paid for but not received out of future production from any or all
wells delivering gas under this contract without further payment.
Id.
81. See id. at 1211.
82. See id.





88. See Roye Realty, 949 P.2d at 1211.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 1211-12.
91. See id. The court relied on OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 540 (1991) (renumbered at OKLA. STAT. tit. 52,
§ 570.10 (Supp. 1997)). See Roye Realty, 949 P.2d at 1211.
92. See Roye Realty, 949 P.2d at 1212-14. See also discussion supra Part II. It is important to note that
the Roye Realty court focused attention on the fact that the jurisdictions finding in favor of royalty owners
were construing royalty clauses containing the term "amount realized." However, the "proceeds" royalty
clause in Roye Realty was never expressly distinguished as a basis for adopting a plain-terms analysis.
93. See id. at 1216. (citing Ross v. The City of Shawnee, 683 P.2d 535, 536 (Okla. 1984)) (the court is
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After stating that the lease terms determined the outcome,94 the court held
that Watson was entitled to royalty on gas produced and sold.' The court then
defined "production" as requiring severance of gas: "[T]he word 'produced' as
it is used in the habendum clause ... mean[s] not only discovery of the prod-
uct, but also extracting it from the ground."' "[G]as is 'sold' when it enters
the purchaser's [pipe]line."' Furthermore, "royalty" is the interest in produc-
tion from the oil and gas lease.'
The court then listed various rules dealing with contract interpretation.
"[T]he intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone if
possible." "The law will not make a better contract than the parties them-
selves entered. ' '""e The function of the court is to enforce the contract as writ-
ten.'0' Thus, the court ruled that "viewing the lease agreement as a whole, a
royalty owner, absent clear language to the contrary in the lease, is not entitled
to share in take-or-pay settlements. ' 1°" The court also denied Watson relief as
a third-party beneficiary because the gas purchase contract was not made for
Watson's express benefit. 3
IV. CRrrTQuE: WRONG LAW, WRONG RESuLT?
A. "Production"
The Roye Realty court stated that "production" for the purposes of the
habendum clause requires actual extraction from the ground.' The case cited
for this proposition is Walden v. Potts."5 However, the supreme court has pre-
viously rejected this interpretation. Walden actually stands only for the idea that
after discovery of oil or gas in paying quantities, the minerals must be brought
forth in pursuance of the covenants and purposes of the lease." Walden has
been cited previously for the erroneous proposition that production requires
actual severance of the minerals."° State v. Carter Oil Co., 8 a case before
the Oklahoma Supreme Court, involved lessors seeking cancellation of an oil
and gas lease for failure to actually produce from a completed gas well after the
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. Id. (citing Walden v. Potts, 152 P.2d 923 (Okia. 1944)).
97. Id. (citing Wood v. TXO Prod. Corp., 854 P.2d 880, 881 (Okla. 1992)).
98. See id. (citing Hays v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 391 P.2d 214 (Okla. 1964)).
99. Id. at 1217 (quoting Panhandle Cooperative Royalty Co. v. Cunningham, 495 P.2d 108, 113 (Okla.
1972)).
100. Id.
101. See id. (citing Great Western Oil & Gas Co. v. Mitchell, 326 P.2d 794,798 (Okla. 1958)).
102. Id.
103. See id. (citing Drummond v. Johnson, 643 P.2d 634 (Okla. 1982)).
104. See id. at 1216.
105. 152 P.2d 923 (Okla. 1944).
106. See generally id.
107. See State v. Carter Oil Co., 336 P.2d 1086, 1094 (Oka. 1958).
108. 336 P.2d 1086 (Okla. 1958).
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primary term, while lessees were seeking a market."° Lessors, citing Walden
as authority, contended that "discovery of oil or gas in paying quantities within
such term is not sufficient, but that such production must be taken from the
ground and marketed within such period."1 The court disagreed, stating that
in Walden discovery of production in paying quantities never occurred within
the primary term."' The court held that production for the purposes of the ha-
bendum clause requires discovery of oil or gas capable of production in paying
quantities."' The implied covenant to market then provides that the lessee
should market the product within a reasonable time." '3
In the most recent case addressing the question of whether gas must be
extracted to be produced, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ratified the Carter Oil
decision. 4 In Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals,"5 the court ruled that the term
"produced" in an oil and gas lease does not require physical extraction of
gas."'6 The habendum clause addressed in the Pack case extended the term of
the lease for so long as oil or gas is "produced."'" 7 The lease also contained a
"cessation of production" clause that provided that the lease would terminate if
production ceased for a period of sixty days."' The parties stipulated that no
gas was extracted under the leases for periods longer than sixty days. The roy-
alty owner argued that no gas had been "produced" for sixty days, so the leases
terminated. The producer argued that the lease is held if it is capable of produc-
ing gas, regardless of actual extraction of the gas. The court ruled for the pro-
ducer, holding that so long as a well is capable of production, gas is "produced"
regardless of whether the producer actually "remove[s] the product from the
ground and market[s] it."".9
The Roye Realty court's definition of production is also at odds with schol-
arly understanding of Oklahoma oil and gas law. In Richard Hemingway's
treatise on oil and gas law, he states that Oklahoma views discovery of produc-
tion in paying quantities as sufficient to satisfy "production" under the haben-
dum clause. 2' "Physical non-production will not terminate the lease as long as
the lessee is acting as a reasonably prudent lessee under the circumstances.'
2
'
Another treatise notes that in Oklahoma "actual production is not necessary to
preserve the lease" but only "completion and capability of production" are
109. See id. at 1094.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 1095.
113. See id.
114. See Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, 869 P.2d 323, 326-27 (Okla. 1994).
115. 869 P.2d 323 (Okla. 1994).
116. See id. at 326-27.
117. See id. at 325.
118. See id. at 327.
119. Id. at 326.
120. See RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 6.4, at 295 (3d ed. 1991) (citing West-
em States Oil & Land Co. v. Helms, 288 P. 964 (Okla. 1930); Kolachny v. Galbreath, 110 P. 902 (Okla.
1910); Frank Oil Co. v. Belleview Gas and Oil Co., 119 P. 260 (Okla. 1911); Parks v. Sinai Oil & Gas Co.,
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required.' Oklahoma's definition of "production" as "the capability to pro-
duce" is well recognized." Thus, the Roye Realty court's treatment of pro-
duction as requiring actual severance of the mineral for the purposes of the
habendum clause is erroneous in light of clear precedent to the contrary that
was not cited, let alone overruled, by the court in Roye Realty.
Finally, the Oklahoma Legislature has determined that take-or-pay pay-
ments are for gas produced and sold. Oklahoma imposes a gross production tax
on the "production" of natural gas, and an excise tax on gas "produced" in the
state of Oklahoma.'24 In defining when gas is "produced" for purposes of the
gross production and excise taxes, the Legislature has determined that when a
gas purchaser makes take-or-pay payments, the payments "are hereby deemed
to be part of the gross value of gas" taken under the contract.'2' Tax is owed
when the payment is received, and, if the gas is later recouped, the producer
simply reports that tax has already been paid.l" If the purchaser later waives
the right to recoup the gas, the take-or-pay payments are "a premium on gas
which was taken" under the gas contract." Therefore, the Roye Realty deci-
sion departed both from the court's own prior definitions of production as well
as the legislature's decision to treat take-or-pay payments as payments for the
production and sale of gas.
B. "Sold"
Citing Wood v. TXO Production Corp.," the Roye Realty court defines
"sold" for the purposes of the royalty clause as occurring at the time the gas
enters the purchaser's pipeline." The issue in Wood was whether the lessee
could deduct compression costs from royalty." ° In other words, the issue cen-
tered on where gas is sold for royalty purposes-at the wellhead or downstream
after compression. However, the Oklahoma decision in Tara Petroleum Corp. v.
Hughey.3 held that the market value of gas is determined when the gas is
dedicated to a long-term gas contract, not when it is actually produced.'32
While these two propositions are not directly inconsistent with one another,
they do provide the court with "wiggle-room" in deciding whether to award
122. JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 187-88 (3d ed. 1995). Also, the primary case-
book on oil and gas law states that Oklahoma is one of the main proponents of the position that "the discov-
ery of oil and gas before the end of the primary term is 'production' within the meaning of the term clause."
EUGENE 0. KumTZ, E" AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 202 (2d ed. 1993).
123. See, e.g., Danne v. Texaco Exploration and Production, Inc. 883 P.2d 210, 217 (Okla. 1994); Pack v.
Santa Fe Minerals, 869 P.2d 323, 329 (Okla. 1994); James Energy Co. v. HCG Energy Corp., 847 P.2d 333,
338-39 (Okla. 1992).
124. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, §§ 1001(b), 1102 (Supp. 1998).
125. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1009(g) (1992).
126. See id.
127. Id.
128. 854 P.2d 880 (Okla. 1992).
129. See Roye Realty, 949 P.2d at 1216.
130. See Wood, 854 P.2d at 880.
131. 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
132. See id. at 1272.
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royalty on take-or-pay benefits. Wood and Tara are consistent with each other
for the proposition that the lessor should share in all actual "proceeds" of sale.
Furthermore, the decision in Tara indicates that, where appropriate, the supreme
court will make a plain-terms analysis that takes into account the economic
reality of the situation and considers the fairness to the parties.
C. Royalty Owners May Succeed Under Plain-terms Analysis
It is entirely possible that the Roye Realty court could have found royalty
due on take-or-pay benefits using a plain-terms analysis. The court could simply
have followed existing precedent which defines "production" as "capability of
production" and provides that proceeds (or market value) of gas, for royalty
purposes, are determined when the gas is dedicated to a long-term contract.
Using these definitions (already well established under Oklahoma case law)
royalty would be due on gas capable of being produced in paying quantities and
sold under a long-term contract. Inasmuch as take-or-pay provisions condition
the purchaser's obligation on the producer's actual ability to tender the gas,'33
the take-or-pay payments are made for the lessee's capability to produce. One
could view take-or-pay clauses as the marketing or sale of the capability of
production. Under this reasoning, the "capability of production" is sold under a
long-term contract via the take-or-pay clause, and royalty is due under the plain
terms of the royalty clause.
D. Characterization of Take-or-Pay Settlements
The Roye Realty court held that "a royalty owner.., is not entitled to
share in take-or-pay settlements."'"M In doing so, the court painted with a
broad brush, failing to consider the varying components of take-or-pay settle-
ments. A take-or-pay settlement may consist of payments settling pricing dis-
putes, nonrecoupable take-or-pay payments, payments recoupable from post-set-
tlement production, contract buy-down payments, and contract buy-out pay-
ments.'35 To the extent that pricing dispute settlements relate to prior produc-
tion, "it is clear that the royalty owner is entitled to recover."' To the extent
that settlement payments are recoupable from future production, even plain-
terms jurisdictions recognize that royalty is owed when the purchaser exercises
its right of recoupment. 37 The Roye Realty court's construction of the royalty
clause supports the conclusion that royalty will be owed on recoupable settle-
ment payments at the time gas is actually produced and taken pursuant to such
133. See supra note 80.
134. Roye Realty, 949 P.2d at 1217.
135. See Kramer, supra note 73, at §14.01. See, e.g., Frey v. Amoco Production Co., 603 So. 2d 170 (La.
1992) (settlement broke down into: $45.6 million as a recoupable take-or-pay payment, $20.9 million as a
non-recoupable take-or-pay payment and $280.2 million as a settlement of past and future price deficiencies).
136. Bruce M. Kramer, Royalty Interest in the United States: Not Cut from the Same Cloth, 29 TULSA
L.J. 449, 474 (1994).
137. See Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell, 98 F.3d 1222, 1236 (10th Cir. 1996).
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payments. Thus, there is an implied exception to the Roye Realty ruling when
payments are recouped through actual production. However, whether the royalty
owner is entitled to the lost time value of recouped payments is unclear.
Nonrecoupable settlements of take-or-pay obligations break down into two
logical subcategories: settlements of obligations not subject to recoupment at the
time of settlement and settlements of obligations that would have been
recoupable if not for the settlement. A settlement of nonrecoupable take-or-pay
obligations does not give a royalty owner a very strong basis for argument in a
plain-terms jurisdiction, because these payments would never be attributable to
production. However, where a settlement payment represents take-or-pay obliga-
tions that could have been recouped by actual production, a nonrecoupable
settlement extinguishes this possibility. It has been suggested that "[b]ecause the
settlement precludes the take-or-pay obligation from ever ripening into an actual
conveyance of natural gas (via the make-up provision), courts should treat these
nonrecoupable payments as constructive production.""
The Roye Realty decision only addressed take-or-pay payments, not buy-
downs or buy-outs of gas purchase contracts. The court's holding that royalty
owners are not third-party beneficiaries to a gas purchase contract, absent an
express provision, limits one possible theory of recovery for royalty owners
seeking royalties on settlements of other kinds of disputes between producers
and purchasers. It does not, however, resolve whether other kinds of gas con-
tract settlements are royalty bearing. However, in a recent decision by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, it has been held that royalties are owed on settlements
which compromise the right of the producer to pursue a higher price for pro-
duction from the leased premises.'39 Since the payments are a component of
the true price paid for past or future production, the payments are for actual
production and royalty is owed."4
The royalty owner's primary argument is that a buy-down payment "re-
flects a payment for a lower future price for the natural gas that will flow under
the contract.' 4' To the extent this is true, a buy-down payment acts as pro-
spective compensation for actual production. Especially where the renegotiated
price is lower than a fair-market price and the buy-down payment is high, the
settlement begins to reflect the validity of the royalty owner's argument. 42 In-
deed, the producers in Frey acknowledged an obligation to pay royalty on the
buy-down payment and did so voluntarily. 43 The corollary to Roye Realty's
138. Kirk J. Bily, Royalty on Take-or-Pay Payments and Related Consideration Accruing to Producers,
27 Hous. L. REv. 105, 134 (1990).
139. See Watts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 115 F.3d 785, 793 (10th Cir. 1997).
140. See id.
141. Patrick H. Martin, Review of Recent Developments: 1991-1992, 53 LA. L. REV. 891, 895 (1993).
142. See Bruce M. Kramer, Royalty Obligations Under the Gun--The Effect of Take-or-Pay Clauses on
the Duty To Make Royalty Payments, 39 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 5-1, 5-30 to 5-31 (1988) ("[I]t
would be manifestly unfair for the royalty owner to accept diminished future returns and not share in the
proceeds of the lump sum payment which is inuring to the benefit of the lessee.").
143. See Frey v. Amoco Production Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 170 (La. 1992). Frey received royalty on the
entire $280.2 million payment made to Amoco for settlement of past and future price deficiencies in natural
gas. See id. The settlement of future price deficiencies represents the buy-down payment.
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holding that royalties are not owed on take-or-pay settlements because they are
not for "production" is that royalties are owed on buy-downs and buy-outs
because such settlements are for gas already sold or to be sold in the future.
Roye Realty's reasoning has been interpreted as consistent with such an obli-
gation to pay royalty on buy-down payments.'" Settlements of pricing claims
are royalty bearing if they relate to either past or future production actually
taken by the settling purchaser." In fact, the Tenth Circuit has found that
royalties are owed on any settlement where a producer receives consideration
for compromising its pricing claim."
The Roye Realty decision appears to limit the royalty obligation to actual
production and delivery under the gas contract. Consistent with Roye Realty, the
Tenth Circuit has held that royalty is owed on "a commensurate portion of the
settlement proceeds that is attributable to price reductions applicable to future
production... as production occurs."'47 The court did not address how the
obligation to pay a "commensurate portion" should be calculated by the produc-
er, but it would presumably constitute an additional premium on the gas as it is
produced.
E. Harmonizing Roye Realty
The Roye Realty court apparently wanted to render a typical plain-terms
decision. Since all plain-terms decisions rely heavily on a definition of "produc-
tion" which requires actual physical severance of the mineral from the ground,
the Roye Realty court did the same. However, as previously discussed, the Roye
Realty court's definition of "production" was erroneous. This is not to say that
Oklahoma courts may not define "production" as actual severance. But in order
to do so without ignoring settled legal doctrine, the court would need to distin-
guish "production" required under the royalty clause from "production" required
under the habendum clause. Yet, the court expressly treated "production" as the
same for the purposes of both clauses, misdefining the term based on long-
established precedent.
The striking contradiction of the court's definitions of "production" can
lead to peculiar situations. For instance, a producer might not deliver any gas
from a well, while receiving take-or-pay payments. There would be "produc-
tion" under the habendum and cessation of production clauses, but no "produc-
tion" under the royalty clause. Thus, the producer gets the benefit of holding
the lease with "production," but does not have to pay royalty on the take-or-pay
payments received because there is no "production."
Oklahoma is also in the unique position of being the only jurisdiction to
144. See Watts, 115 F.3d at 791.
145. See id. at 793.
146. See id. See also United States v. Century Offshore Management Corp., 111 F.3d 443, 450 (6th Cir.
1997) (finding royalty owed on a lump sum contract buy-out payment where new contracts were executed
contemporaneously with the settlement and that the lump sum was an advance payment for production under
the new contracts).
147. Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell, 98 F.3d 1222, 1236 (10th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
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define market value as the dedicated contract price while denying royalty on
take-or-pay benefits."4 The relationship between the two decisions may not be
apparent at first glance. The decision defining market value for the purposes of
the royalty clause as the dedicated contract price was based on market realities
facing the parties, the probable intent of the parties, and notions of fairness to
the parties." In contrast, the Roye Realty decision makes a strict, plain-terms
interpretation of the royalty clause without considering the underlying economic
reality that take-or-pay payments are made in return for the capability to pro-
duce gas from the minerals leased by the royalty owner to the producer. 50
Perhaps a desire not to put additional burdens on the industry accounts for these
differing methodologies.' Perhaps the decisions reflect a desire to reduce the
amount of litigation that would certainly proliferate if the decisions were other-
wise.'52 In any event, it appears Oklahoma lessors who were not protected in
the market value litigation, as occurred in Texas and other states,'53 are also
not protected from gas contracts that provide for consideration to the producer
in the form of take-or-pay payments."'
It may be possible to distinguish Oklahoma's plain-terms decision in Roye
Realty from the decisions of courts adopting the same minority view on market
value as Oklahoma. Both Louisiana and Arkansas have royalty-defining statutes
that may have influenced courts applying their law to adopt the broader cooper-
ative venture analysis.'55 As Oklahoma has no such statutory language, the
Roye Realty decision may be viewed as consistent with the decisions of other
jurisdictions. The fact that the royalty clauses in the Frey and Klein cases pro-
vided for royalty on "amount realized" rather than on "proceeds"' 56 from the
148. See Lowe, supra note 2, at 233, 267. Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Arkansas all held that "market val-
ue" is the dedicated contract price. Louisiana and Arkansas law has also been applied to find that royalties are
due on take-or-pay benefits. See id.
149. See Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1274 (Okla. 1981).
150. See Roye Realty, 949 P.2d at 1216.
151. A case can be made that royalty, which operates similar to an excise tax, leads to inefficient deci-
sions and underground waste because production burdened by royalty interests will become uneconomical
before production that is not burdened by royalty interests; however, the lessees drafted lease forms that con-
tained the royalty clause and the clause provides the lessor with the primary consideration paid for a produc-
tive lease.
152. Of course, it might be argued that the statute of limitations would have expired for many of these
claims. But see Patrick H. Martin, Review of Recent Developments: 1991-1992, 53 LA. L. REV. 891, 896
(1993) (discussing royalty owner's attempts to circumvent the Statute of Limitations and citing Frey as sup-
port).
153. See, eg., Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
154. The Arkansas Supreme Court in Hillard v. Stephens, 637 S.W.2d 581 (Ark. 1982), and the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982), both ruled against royalty
owners in determining market value, following the reasoning in Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d.
1269 (Okla. 1981). However, Klein v. Jones, 980 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1992), applying Arkansas law, found in
favor of royalty owners on the take-or-pay issue, as did Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992),
applying Louisiana law. With the decision in Roye Realty, Oklahoma royalty owners lose out on both issues.
155. See Lowe, supra note 2, at 257 ("[Bloth Frey and Klein were based in part upon unusual state stat-
utes that may expand the royalty obligation .... Most states, including Oklahoma, apparently have no such
legislation.").
156. The royalty clause in Roye Realty provided for royalty on gas "produced and sold" and was based on
"gross proceeds" received for the gas sold. See Roye Realty, 949 P.2d at 1214. The royalty clause in Klein
provided for royalty on gas "produced and sold" and was based on "market value" of such gas. See Klein,
980 F.2d at 525. The royalty clause in Frey provided for royalty on gas "sold" and was based on "amount
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sale of gas is another distinguishing element. Furthermore, the Frey court hinted
that it would use a plain-terms analysis if the royalty clause was based on "pro-
duction" rather than "amount realized.' '17 To the extent this implication is
correct, Oklahoma's decision in Roye Realty is in line with Frey. However, as
pointed out above, the way "production" and "sold" are defined in the Roye
Realty decision is inconsistent with Oklahoma precedent. The outcome of a
plain-terms analysis in Oklahoma using the established, pre-Roye Realty defini-
tion of "production" might have led to a different result.
V. CONCLUSION
Oklahoma's adoption of a "plain-terms" analysis is bad news for royalty
owners seeking a share of take-or-pay settlements. Nevertheless, to the extent
such settlements are recoupable payments for future production, royalties should
still be paid when the payments are recouped through actual production. The
same is true for buy-down and buy-out payments that constitute consideration
for production. While the plain-terms analysis does not necessarily destroy a
theory of recovery for an Oklahoma royalty owner, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court has made its convictions on the matter clear. Considering all the "wiggle-
room" the court had in rendering a decision on this issue, it is likely that
Oklahoma's highest court will not waver from the current result.
realized" at the well from such sales. See Frey, 603 So. 2d at 169.
157. See Frey, 603 So. 2d at 169.
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